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# COMMUNITY POLICING ASSESSMENT IN NORTHERN UGANDA

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# COMMUNITY POLICING ASSESSMENT IN NORTHERN UGANDA



**Management Systems  
International  
Corporate Offices**

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## **DISCLAIMER**

The author's views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

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## METHODOLOGY

The assessment research, analysis and conclusions are based on personal interviews conducted in Uganda,<sup>1</sup> a review of written materials,<sup>2</sup> and observations made during the course of field visits.

## INTRODUCTION

In August of 2004 Congress passed the Northern Uganda Crisis Response Act which called upon the United States Government (USG) to support efforts to seek a just, lasting and peaceful resolution of the conflict in Northern Uganda.

In December of 2004 Congress granted new authority to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) under Section 5064 of the Appropriations Act. This authority allows USAID to “enhance the effectiveness and accountability of civilian police authority through training and technical assistance . . .”

The United States, the World Bank, the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, and many international observers, believe that an effective police force is essential to establishing the rule of law and creating the stability and security necessary to allow post-conflict recovery in a country such as Uganda.

The United States Mission in Uganda is committed to post-conflict reconciliation and recovery in Northern Uganda and has articulated their commitment in the USAID/UGANDA Post- Conflict Reconciliation and Recovery Action Plan for Northern Uganda (2005-2007).

It is in the spirit of these Congressional Acts; the strong consensus among international observers on the need for security and stability to support recovery in all other areas of development assistance; and the commitment of the USAID Mission in Uganda that this assessment was conducted and the following recommendations are being made.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The nineteen year conflict in Northern Uganda with the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), coupled with the complicated political and cultural history in this country, has created some unusual challenges to the process of restoring a credible police presence and viable criminal justice system in Northern Uganda. However, there is a strong desire for peace in Uganda. The Ugandan people are incredibly peaceful, forgiving and resilient. The Ugandan Police Force (UPF) appear to be well led and committed to progressive development. These factors create the opportunity for restoring a civilian police presence and access to justice. A discussion of challenges, opportunities and specific steps forward will be offered in this summary.

The conflict in Northern Uganda has displaced an estimated 1.4 million people. There are now 200 Internally Displaced Person (IDP) camps in Northern Uganda. More than twenty thousand children have been abducted and brutalized by the LRA as fighters or sex slaves. On March 10, 2005 seven villagers

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<sup>1</sup> See appendix A1

<sup>2</sup> See appendix A2

were hacked to death in the Adjumani District in the latest atrocity by the LRA.<sup>3</sup> Criminal activity such as rape, defilement, assault, robbery and trafficking in small arms appear to be common and vastly under-reported in the North, particularly in the IDP camps.

Most security responsibilities in the North relating to the LRA conflict are carried out by the Ugandan People's Defense Force (UPDF). Many observers believe that the entire law and order system in the North has been militarized over the course of nineteen years or worse yet is now dominated by tribal customs and vigilante justice.<sup>4</sup> A spokesman for the UPDF said that conflict related crime should be handled by the police. According to this source the UPDF has only intervened because of the seriousness of the situation and because the police could not handle the problems given the small number of police personnel assigned in the North.<sup>5</sup>

The police cannot handle the insurgency. In my opinion they should not be expected to. This insurgency is not a typical domestic law enforcement responsibility and should remain as a responsibility of the UPDF. The fact is that the UPF is not in a strong position to handle basic criminal responsibilities in Northern Uganda at the present time for a variety of reasons.

The police are undermanned by any international standard.<sup>6</sup> The UPF processes for recruitment, hiring, training and promotions are being reviewed and discussed at a national level and would benefit from international assistance. These are issues with important social implications for Ugandans. Police recruitment should be of great concern to the international donor community as well based on the prospect of the police recruiting personnel from Local Defense Units (LDU), Local Administration Police (LAP) and from the local militias.<sup>7</sup> The police have almost no communication and transportation resources in the North leaving them largely unable to respond to crimes or transport prisoners for court appearances.<sup>8</sup> Government housing for policemen who will be recruited is inadequate or non-existent in most Districts. The police have many capital needs including the need for a training facility to prepare new recruits. The police will be evicted by the military within the next three years from their only training site located in Masindi District. This will occur at the peak of their hiring cycle. The police suffer from an image problem in the North where they have been rendered virtually obsolete due to the insurgency and the presence and role of the UPDF.<sup>9</sup> The issues of police corruption and poor accountability have also been widely reported on. Finally, the critical links between the police, prosecutors, the judiciary and the prison system have broken down stalling access to justice nation wide.

However, as I mentioned reasons for hope do exist. In my view any effort to help the IDP population and prepare the North for post conflict law and order must begin immediately. Residents seem anxious to return to their villages. Residents seem willing to see the UPDF demobilized when possible and to work with the Police to restore order in the North. The Justice Law & Order Secretariat (JLOS), the District Commissions, Local Councils and the National Police leadership are aware of the need to prepare for post-conflict policing, but need to overcome a dearth of resources and political inertia to turn plans into action.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> The New Vision, March 11, 2005, page 1.

<sup>4</sup> Opinion expressed by police, UPDF, politicians and villagers interviewed

<sup>5</sup> Interview with Lt. Colonel Francis Ochoka

<sup>6</sup> Interview with the District Police Commander

<sup>7</sup> Mentioned as a possible solution to the manpower shortage by most government officials interviewed

<sup>8</sup> Observed during field visit to police post in Gulu

<sup>9</sup> Consensus of residents and political representatives in the North

<sup>10</sup> See documents such as the Police Comprehensive Policing of the Post Conflict North; National Policy for Internally Displaced Persons; and the March 3, 2005 by the Minister for Disaster Preparedness and Refugees on security issues.

The government of Uganda must demonstrate the political will to make access to justice and improvements in the police a priority. With an exercise of host country political will and an infusion of resources and expertise by the international donor community obstacles to the restoration of justice can be overcome. The police are receiving very little in the way of international assistance now. There are no full time technical advisors from any nation working with the police on their short term or long term development needs.<sup>11</sup> Our Embassy through the RSO's office is administering Department of Justice programs with INL money mostly in support of the Police Criminal Investigation Division.

Law and order is the foundation upon which our collective ability to address the many needs of the IDP population must be built. Without an effective police force and access to justice, assistance in the areas of health, democracy & governance, food and water, education and economic revitalization cannot be effective or sustainable.

I see a strong link between congressional language authorizing USAID to improve the effectiveness and accountability of civilian police authority and the ability of USAID to deliver on their other developmental priorities in Uganda. I believe the following specific assistance should be provided to the police:

- Assign a resident police advisor to work in Kampala & Pader with the National Police command staff and with the Northern Regional Police Commander. This Advisor will provide direct technical assistance, assist USAID Kampala and the Embassy with implementation of programs, coordinate US and international donor assistance to the police, and promote transparency in the relationship between Ugandan government and this vital security agency.
- Enhance and expand the police commitment to the philosophy of community oriented policing through training, community outreach and organized coalition building with community groups around major social problems such as gender based violence and human rights issues.
- Assist the police with establishing personnel functions such as recruitment, hiring and promotions that meet international standards and the needs and expectations of Ugandan people.
- Assist the training division with establishing or enhancing curriculum and teaching methodology for basic training; junior, middle and senior supervisory training; and in-service training for all personnel.
- Assist the police legal affairs office with establishing or enhancing a credible anti-corruption mechanism in which the public and the police can have confidence.
- Assist the police and JLOS sector with improving access to justice by strengthening the link between the police, prosecutors, the judiciary and the prison system.

The international community is familiar with the "security gap" that can occur in post conflict recovery efforts. Many people in Uganda are concerned about demobilizing the military and "demilitarizing" the justice system in the North before police capacity has been strengthened. This gap may lead to an increase in crimes such as domestic and sexual violence, property and land disputes, theft, robbery, revenge murders, cattle rustling and arms trafficking which will overwhelm police and justice sector resources. If this happens tribal and vigilante justice will flourish, the police and government will be rendered obsolete and law and order will be even more difficult to restore.

Meeting the capital planning and acquisition needs of the UPF, particularly with buildings, vehicles and communication equipment is critical, but beyond the scope of USAID authority. The Ugandan Government will have to rise to this challenge. However, it may be possible to coordinate with the

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<sup>11</sup> Statement of Inspector General of Police Katumba Wamala

Department of State INL and with international donors to ensure coordination between capital acquisitions and USAID development assistance for the police.

These recommendations are intended to be relevant to conflict and post-conflict conditions. These recommendations are also intended to address the short term needs in the North while being adaptable to post-conflict conditions and law enforcement needs throughout Uganda so that some measure of sustainability can be achieved and all citizens of Uganda will benefit.

I strongly recommend that USAID include the provision of police assistance in their plan for Uganda.

## **FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS**

### **Community Policing in the North**

Community Oriented Policing is talked about in the North, but is not practiced. The nineteen year conflict with LRA has given the Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF) almost exclusive control over security in rebel affected areas. The UPDF are professional soldiers and do not understand and do not practice civilian or community oriented policing. As a result the mindset of the residents in the North has been "militarized" in terms of how they view security. The population is in constant fear of the LRA. Understandably they are also preoccupied with survival and issues such as food, water, shelter and disease.

According to reports from many camp residents and some District and Local Council members the protectors have also become the abusers. There were many reports of UPDF and Local Defense Units (LDU) shooting unarmed civilians, stealing food, and committing crimes against camp residents, especially of a sexual nature. Thus the Ugandans were often afraid of the very people who were supposed to be protecting them. Most Ugandans we talked to felt there was little opportunity to address their grievances with the UPDF and if they did so they could expect no transparency in the process and they may suffer retribution.

The police in the North have been rendered obsolete in the opinion of most observers. Where rebel related violence is widespread and the UPDF has a strong presence civilians referred to the police as cowards. In places where there was less rebel activity and the police were more visible civilians said they favored the police over the military, but they felt that the police were ineffective. Neither view takes in to account the fact that the police lack the manpower, equipment and training to meet the needs of the people in Northern Uganda. I will use Pader District, which we visited, as a basis for my analysis. Pader District has approximately 300,000 residents. More than 90% or an estimated 293,000 people are displaced. In Pader District the police have projected their post conflict needs at 280– 350 officers to be deployed in 18 sub-counties, 60 vehicles and 24 radios. During my visit it was discovered that Pader District has 110 Central Police Officers, one working vehicle and two working radios. In a neighboring District camp there were 63,000 camp residents being protected by 7 Central Police Officers. In addition the police report that in Pader District police posts were closed down by security concerns or destroyed by the LRA leaving them with only two operational police posts in the entire District.

These factors have created a path toward alternative justice. We heard many reports that crimes such as rape and defilement were being addressed by negotiated compensation between families of the suspect and victim, with little regard to the individual victim's plight. We also saw and observed examples of "mob justice" in which the community took adjudication and punishment in to their own hands. In one case while we were in a camp a drunken man wandered in to a camp and assaulted a resident. A call was placed to a police supervisor who did not have manpower or a vehicle to respond

with. The report came back a short time later that the residents had beaten the suspect severely and there was no longer a need for the police to respond. They did not respond.

Community oriented policing in the North is also hampered by the underreporting of crime, the inability of the police to manage crime statistics, and the lack of opportunity for the police to work in any proactive role with the community they serve. Due to inadequate access to conventional justice, an over-reliance on alternative forms of justice and the issue of social stigma, people generally do not report crime. Thus there are no valid base line statistics on any category of crime in Northern Uganda and no way to deploy police resources based on crime information.

When crime is reported the police, mechanisms for accepting reports, storing and retrieving reports and publishing any kind of reliable crime statistics is virtually non-existent. Crime reports that are accepted by the police are hand written in a log book and do not lend themselves to being recalled, managed or reported in any reliable manner.

The situation in the North leaves little opportunity for the police to participate in any meaningful coalition building or preventive outreach in partnership with the community they serve. There is a "community liaison officer" assigned in each District, but these officers have neither the time nor the opportunity to be effective given the conditions in the North. There is a child and family unit and at least one officer in Pader district who works on issues of gender based violence, but she has nothing in the way of community based partners or social services to support her work. The education system is breaking down and does not offer a forum for the police to engage in prevention programs. Community policing as we know it is not taking place in Northern Uganda.

The lack of any legitimate policing in the North can also be linked to the breakdown in the rest of the criminal justice system. During our meetings with the (Justice Law & Order Secretariat) JLOS sector it became clear that judges and prosecutors do not want to work in the North during this period of instability and there are too few working prisons in the North. The administrators of the prison system, prosecutor's office and judiciary have not yet submitted plans for post conflict justice in Northern Uganda and would benefit from international assistance in putting those plans and budgets in place.

## **Community Policing in Uganda Generally**

The Ugandan Police Force (UPF) Command Staff based in Kampala does have a grasp on the concepts of community oriented policing and policing in a democratic society, but they are hampered by the same obstacles we observed in the North and some other obstacles of National concern.

I met with Inspector General Katumba Wamala, Assistant Inspector General for Operations Mr. Frances X. Rwego, Assistant Inspector General for Administration Mr. Eric Turyatunga and with the Superintendent of Police who leads the community policing unit. I found them to be educated, well informed, articulate and committed individuals.

While the UPF command staff embraces the idea of community oriented policing and would like to make it an organizational philosophy community oriented policing is still just a program.

The UPF suffers from a severe lack of manpower. The target strength for the UPF is 30,000 officers and they estimate their current strength at 13,500. The police now rely heavily on Special Police Constables (SPC) as a way of boosting their numbers.

Special Police Constables are hired from the community with less education than regular officers, experience a shortened training program and are hired on temporary contracts of 4– 6 months subject to review and termination. The UPF also relies on the UPDF and LDU in emergency situations in these other regions of Uganda.



I went on patrol with the police in Kampala and had an opportunity to interact with 999 emergency patrol officers in all 7 divisions making up the city of Kampala. I was able to observe some call activity and interact with the police and the public in the wake of those calls, visit the emergency call centers in three division police stations, visit the holding cells and interview prisoners. I was impressed with the courteous, sincere and dedicated nature of the men and women on patrol. They talked comfortably and openly about their strengths and weakness and treated people respectfully during their community interaction. Unfortunately the force which is deployed in the city is a rapid reaction force and does little in the way of prevention or proactive community outreach.

Like in many other struggling countries the police were deployed in pick up trucks with a driver and supervisor in the front and at least four officers with heavy arms in the back. Five districts had two 999 units out with 6 men in each and two districts had three 999 units out with 6 men in each.

The 999 emergency call centers in each division station including the central station in downtown Kampala were manned by one officer with one phone and one radio.

I was told that they handle as many as 1,000 calls per day. I looked in a log book for March 12 and observed one call on the books for an attempted car jacking. During my patrol time I observed one call for possible mob justice at a market and one simple assault. For a city the size of Kampala it was very quiet. I did not observe any Criminal Investigative Division (CID), Traffic Division, or Violent Crime Crack Unit officers that may have been deployed on the day of my patrol.

In addition to the manpower shortage I was told that government housing and sanitation for officers throughout Uganda, police buildings, jails cells and training facilities are all a major problem. My visit to each of those places confirmed that fact. The barracks in Kampala are over-crowded, in deplorable condition and unsanitary. The police buildings are broken down, dirty, understaffed, and barely functional as police stations. The jail cells would be grounds for law suits in the United States. Several men were housed in a single cell and there were no apparent sanitation facilities. Officers told me that they separated male, female and juvenile prisoners, but I did not observe any capacity to do so.

The vehicle fleet is aging and inadequate in numbers and the radio system appeared to be archaic but functioning. As a back up to the radio system most supervisors were equipped with cell phones to stay in touch with Headquarters and their division stations.

The members of the public I interviewed said their opinion of the police has been improving because of a friendlier attitude from the police and an apparent reduction in major crime in the city. Even prisoners I interviewed said that they would much rather interact with the police than with the UPDF or LDU. They said the police did their job and treated them with respect.

There is a community policing unit within the UPF which numbers around 300 officers, but they appear to be having a limited impact nationwide. They receive specialized training over the course of 30 days and are deployed throughout the police regional commands. Their job is to help "educate and inform the public".

The officers I spoke to acknowledge that the mechanism for getting feedback from the public on their needs and expectations needs to be strengthened. The officers I spoke to acknowledge that training in community oriented policing needs to be improved and injected in to every level of the organization including basic training for new recruits, in-service training for veteran officers and officers assigned to specialized units such as CID, and supervisory training for junior, middle and senior level supervisors. None of the patrol officers or supervisors I spoke to in the field had been to any in-service or community policing training. Their experience levels ranged from 2 to 16 years.

The largest allocation of manpower in the UPF is in Operations including the 999 units. The manpower shortage coupled with the way they are deployed in groups of 6 and given their rapid reaction role in

the community, their opportunity to build partnerships and relationships in the community is limited. The police do participate in many government coalitions, but need to create or participate in community based grassroots coalitions in order to establish themselves as a credible force in the community.

The American Bar Association has been working with the child and family section of the Community Policing Division on the issue of trafficking in persons. Like most donors they have worked through a small and select group of individuals within the force. The police would benefit greatly from more opportunities to form working coalitions with community based partners on all major social issues, including corruption, gender based violence, human rights compliance and crime prevention. They must also find ways to make these issues a priority with every member of the UPF not just selected individuals and specialized units.

Corruption and poor public image have been a problem for the UPF. During our visit a District Police Commander suspended traffic enforcement road blocks in his district after he was stopped and solicited for a bribe while off duty by one of his own men. Action has been taken to attack these problems. After a major government study on police corruption several key figures in the police were dismissed. The Inspector General recognized his responsibility to clean house and get a grasp on this problem. He is now concerned about finding the proper balance between the obligation to weed out corruption and the obligation to protect the due process rights of his honest employees. This role is now in the hands of his legal affairs division. While anti-corruption steps have been taken more work can be done by putting credible, effective systems in place that the public can understand and access and which protect the due process rights of accused officers. The Inspector General acknowledged his need for donor assistance in this area.

The most effective justice sector reform happens when all phases of the justice system are strengthened. The links between the police, prosecutors, judicial and prison systems in Uganda must be strengthened. The Ugandan JLOS Secretariat is working on this issue, but the police are still hampered by flaws in their investigations, evidence collection and case management; inadequate numbers of prosecutors and judges; allegations of corruption within the ranks of prosecutors and judges; overcrowded and inadequate prisons; and unreasonable lengths of pre-trial detention. The JLOS secretariat is a very good working group and is looking at these issues. However, during our meetings they told us that they have no international donors working with police prosecutors, judges or the prisons. It is a critical time for these agencies to be planning and implementing post-conflict operational plans and all sectors indicated that they would benefit from international assistance now.

With potentially contentious elections coming in 2006 there are many citizens and observers who worry about the police being politicized. Some citizens and media representatives we spoke to believe that the army and the President's Protection Detail slip in to police uniforms at will and compromise the public's confidence in the police. This charge was vehemently denied by every police officer I spoke to. However, the UPF is one of the principal security agencies of the Ugandan government. They are under-manned, under-trained, and overburdened. The opportunity for using the police inappropriately or having them mishandle election time violence is real. I did have occasion to observe the preparation for a Presidential motorcade and see the level of cooperation between the Presidential Protection Force, the UPDF and the UPF. All three groups were identifiable. They coordinated their work well. It did not appear that there was any confusion over roles or manpower.

There are many problems to be overcome as the leadership of the UPF tries to move this agency forward. According to the police command staff, there are no international donors working full time with the police. In fact they cited the ICITAP program and money from INL being administered by the office of the Regional Security Officer as one of the few current sources of assistance. The focus of this assistance has been on the Criminal Investigations Division, some "train the trainer" courses for academy instructors and forensic assistance. However, the police would benefit from assistance that might be provided to the other three sectors of the JLOS system. The police appear to be ahead of

these other organizations in terms of planning and projecting their post-conflict needs. The police need these other sectors to keep pace if civilian justice is to be restored.

However, there are reasons to be optimistic and some reasons to direct USAID assistance to the UPF.

## Opportunities

The leadership of the UPF and the men and women of the Operations branch with whom I interacted during my visit are one source of hope. I came away with a clear sense of their commitment to doing the right thing. This is always satisfying, but is particularly satisfying given the incredibly difficult circumstances under which they work.

The March 2003 UPF Strategic Plan is a very good document with some positive forward thinking objectives that has manifested itself in action. For example Objective 1.5 speaks to the issue of revamping the image of the force. The UPF are taking this responsibility seriously and have taken some steps such as creating the Community Policing Division. With respect to their image and their relationship with the community they have also acknowledged that they need help with community policing and anti-corruption measures, which is a significant opportunity for growth. I will lay out some specific ideas we discussed in the recommendations section of this report. Objective 2.1 describes the need to improve training, educational opportunities and career development for all members of the force. Some work in this area has been done in cooperation with the RSO and ICITAP, but much more remains to be done. Objective 2.6 describes the need to ensure adequate and quality staffing of the force and they have attempted to move toward that goal by recruiting Special Police Constables.

The effort by the police to research and write the paper “Comprehensive Policing of the Post Conflict North” demonstrates that they are taking their responsibility to plan and prepare very seriously. A personnel and budget plan has been prepared and submitted through the Ministry of Internal Affairs and is awaiting government action.

The police appear to be active participants in the JLOS sector discussions and are involved with District and Local Council Disaster Management and Security Committees.

I was also impressed by the peaceful, forgiving and resilient nature of the Ugandan people. There is certainly a threat that the crime problem in Uganda, particularly in the North, will grow worse in a post-conflict situation as people return to their villages. However, it was noticeable to a person with 30 years of law enforcement experience around the world just how safe Uganda really is, but for the violent acts of the LRA.

I believe that successful implementation of a basic law enforcement development program will prevent a security gap, support the work of USAID and international donors in other sectors and help keep Uganda from falling in to a state of lawlessness and economic and social decline.

## Conclusion

There is no question that USAID Uganda is faced with critical and competing priorities. As we have discussed, food, water, sanitation, education and disease are just a few. I have heard it said that no one is quite sure where community policing fits within those priorities. My bias toward the importance of community policing and access to justice is obvious. However, I think there is general agreement that improving the effectiveness and accountability of the Ugandan Police Force directly supports key pieces of the USAID/Uganda Post- Conflict Reconciliation and Recovery Action Plan for Northern Uganda. Specifically, 4.1 Emergency Assistance: People need to feel safe to avail themselves of assistance with food, water, sanitation, education and disease prevention. 4.3 Protection: There is no more vulnerable population than the IDP. The UPDF has proven ineffective in protecting women and children from

sexual exploitation and other forms of crime and the civilian police are their best hope. 4.4 Reconciliation: The police will be expected to play a major role in preventing post conflict revenge killings and other phenomena which grow out of this conflict. 4.5 Democracy and Governance: Clearly strengthening local government, building local government institutions, and promoting economic recovery cannot take root without a credible police presence and access to justice.

The crucial question has to do with the Government of Uganda political will. They have refused to declare Northern Uganda a disaster area. The budget and personnel plan for the police has been submitted to government, but no one can say what is likely to happen with that budget and personnel plan. The vulnerable nature of this presidency could make the politicization of the police and military more likely in coming months. Several important pieces of legislation proposing various amendments to the police law are pending without much in the way of international scrutiny or input. The fate of this important legislation is unknown.

It is my strong belief that the interests of the UPF, the citizens of Uganda and the government of the United States would be served by placing a senior law enforcement advisor in Uganda.

## **RECOMMENDED ACTIVITIES AND OUTCOME MEASURES**

### **Activity 1: Appoint a Resident Police Advisor (RPA) for a period of 6–12 months**

#### **Expected Outcomes:**

The RPA will provide direct technical assistance to UPF command staff and the Northern Regional Police Commander.

The RPA will assist USAID and the US Embassy with coordinating US and International donor assistance to the UPF to avoid duplication and conflict.

The RPA's presence and influence will promote transparency in the relationship between the Government of Uganda and the UPF during this critical time in Uganda's history.

### **Activity 2: Establish a community policing philosophy within the UPF**

#### **Expected Outcomes:**

A new community policing training and orientation program will be developed.

The new training will be delivered to all UPF personnel.

A community policing survey will be constructed and executed with a wide cross section of Ugandan citizens to measure their attitudes towards and expectations for the UPF.

Establish and strengthen the role of the UPF in civil society by creating working community based coalitions on important social issues such as corruption, human rights compliance, gender based violence and crime prevention.

### **Activity 3: Strengthen the personnel functions of the UPF**

#### **Expected Outcomes:**

Establish a written and implemented recruiting, hiring and retention policy that complies with the law and gets the UPF the best possible candidates.

Establish and implement a sound employee evaluation and promotion system.

### **Activity 4: Strengthen the training division of the UPF**

#### **Expected Outcomes:**

A job task analysis will be done and a new recruit curriculum developed.

A sustainable Instructor and Curriculum Development Unit will be established.

Training will be established and delivered to all junior, middle and senior level supervisors.

An in-service and mobile training capacity will be established for the UPF

### **Activity 5: Strengthen the Legal Affairs Division and create a comprehensive anti-corruption mechanism**

#### **Expected Outcomes:**

An office of professional responsibility will be established that meets international standards.

The public will have a clear understanding of how to access the office of professional responsibility

Police employees will be accorded due process in the investigation and adjudication of complaints of misconduct.

### **Activity 6: Strengthen the link between the police, prosecutors, judiciary and prison system and thereby improve access to justice in a model district**

#### **Expected outcomes:**

A model district will be established in Pader. Working with the JLOS Secretariat the necessary resources from the police, prosecutors, judiciary and the prisons will be put in place so that security and access to civilian justice will be restored. This will allow the people of the North to experience a system of investigation, arrest, prosecution, adjudication and imprisonment (or restorative justice) that works efficiently and effectively thereby restoring confidence in civilian justice.

The JLOS Secretariat will be supported in producing post-conflict strategic plans and budgets for all sectors to allow the Government of Uganda to demonstrate their political will in supporting the restoration of justice in Northern Uganda.

## APPENDIX 1: PARTIAL LIST OF INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED

USAID Mission and Embassy Staff from Kampala

Lira District Officials and Camp residents including District and LDC Commissioners, Police Commanders and UPDF

Officials from IRC and AVSI

Bala IDP camp residents and representatives

Palenga Camp residents and representatives

Gulu District Officials and Camp residents including District and LDC Commissioners, Police Commanders and UPDF

Representatives of ACDI/VOCA, UPHOLD, UNICEF, UD OCHA, Rachele Rehab Center

Ugandan Electoral Commission

National Police Command Staff

Ministry of Local Government

Inspector General of Police Major General Katumba Wamala

Asst. Inspector of Police for Operations Francis X. Rwego

Ass. Inspector of Police for Administration Eric Turtyatunga

Asst. Supt. Of Police Asan ? Community Policing Head

Inspector in charge of Patrol ?

Mr. Edward Ochom – National Police JLOS coordinator 071-49-654

Frank Nyakairu – Reporter for Monitor Publications in Uganda

Mr. W. D. Odwedo Owere Ochienghs Admin officer for Lira District

Charles Angiro Gutomoi Member of Parliament from Lira and Erute County

Edwin Yakobo Komakech District Chairperson Pader District

Simon Osborn Program Manager Donor Democracy and Governance Group Election Support

Jerry Henderson Uganda Legislative Support Activity

Andrew Timpson Head of Sub Office in Gulu for UN OCHA

Bernie Runnenbaum ACDI/VOCA

Don Campbell Senior Election Consultant IFES

SDUII Alfred Ogwang, Kevin Curnow, Anka Kitunzi, Robert Kehew,

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## **APPENDIX 2 : MATERIALS READ IN SUPPORT OF THE ASSESSMENT**

GOU National Policy for Internally Displaced Persons 2005

Ugandan Police Practical Planning Manual 2004

The Principles of Area Policing – IG Francis Rwego AIGP/OPS 2005

Ugandan Police Summary of Strategic Implementation Plans ( Simplan ) 2003

MSI/CMM Statement of Work February 22, 2005

Ugandan Police Comprehensive Policing of the post conflict North

Minister for Disaster Preparedness and Refugees Office of the Prime Minister

Statement on Implementation for security in Teso, Acholi and Lango regions March 2004

USAID/UGANDA Post-Conflict Reconciliation and Recovery Action Plan for Northern Uganda 2005-2007

Uganda IDP Assessment Statement of Work March 2005

Pader Peace Forum Work Plan 2005

ICITAP Assessment by Eric Beinhart from December of 2002

Crime and Disorder in Uganda from New Vision August 2004

US Department of State Background Notes: Uganda

Justice Law and Order Sector Criminal Justice Baseline Survey Nov 2002



## **SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT: PREPARED FOLLOWING THE WASHINGTON DC USAID BRIEFING HELD ON MARCH 25, 2005**

Issues posed by Liz Hume on behalf of the briefing group assembled on March 25, 2005.

### **Issue One: Explain the division of labor between the police and the military**

I think it is important to establish the military as the perimeter security and counter-insurgency force in Uganda and begin relieving them of the “police functions” they have taken on in recent years.

The military should continue to supply a protective ring around IDP camps, villages and principal transportation routes in an effort to protect civilians from rebel forces. The military should also be the principal force in active counter-insurgency efforts which would include defensive battles with rebel forces that attack targets in large groups and offensive strikes aimed at killing and capturing rebels and weakening the insurgency.

However the civilian police presence should be strengthened and should begin to assume responsibility for arresting and prosecuting domestic crimes committed by individuals or small groups of rebels. This would include crimes such as homicide, kidnapping, rape, theft and robbery.

The military system of justice is ineffective. High ranking members of the rebel forces are being granted amnesty when they return from the bush. Most civilians are troubled by the notion of the International Criminal Court being used against the rebels because they think it is weakening the negotiated peace process. Thus, giving the police the responsibility and the tools to prosecute these kinds of domestic crimes locally represents the logical and preferred division of labor between the police and the military.

### **Issue two: Political will in Uganda in terms of fiscal support for reform and the acceptance of police advisors**

One can judge political will in a variety of ways, including talk of commitment, action indicating commitment, and budgetary allocations as three examples. Certainly there was plenty of talk of commitment during this trip. The Local Council members, members of Parliament and appointed public officials such as the Inspector General of Police all indicated a strong desire to see the Justice Law and Order Sector strengthened.

The Inspector General of Police and the JLOS representatives from the Uganda Prison Service, The Directorate of Public Prosecutions and The Judicial Service Commission all indicated a strong desire to accept international donor assistance to support reform and improvements in the JLOS sector.

The last published report on JLOS sector fiscal support (from 2002) showed significant government increases in spending on police, prisons, public prosecutions, and the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs. It was reported in Criminal Justice Baseline Survey that the Ugandan Government development budget for the JLOS sector was three times bigger than the combined donor budget for the JLOS sector in 2002. This data suggests a strong commitment and political will as well.

Overall, I would assess the political will as strong but it is clear that there are many competing priorities and revenue shortfalls particularly at the District and Sub-County levels.

### **Issue three: The holistic approach to justice sector reform**

As mentioned in the principal report the JLOS sector would benefit greatly from broad support that strengthens the four key pieces of this sector – the police, prosecutors, courts and prisons. We used

the example of strengthening the police to the point where they can successfully investigate crime and arrest offenders only to have a corrupt or inefficient prosecutorial system or judicial system allow the criminals to escape punishment.

This approach is ideal. However, the entire system is only as strong as its weakest link. Therefore, I do think that providing support only to the police if competing priorities and funding demand that approach would be a useful strategy.

The police are clearly the first line of defense in the domestic security area. They are in desperate need of institutional support and long term development. The menu of items articulated in the main report are meant to be free standing areas of support that can and should be implemented separately if necessary.

Helping the police improve their supervisory methods, their training division, their personnel practices, their anti-corruption mechanisms and their community based partnerships will go along way toward making the police more viable partners when and if a more holistic approach to justice sector reform can be undertaken.